Surveillance for Anthrax Cases Associated with Contaminated Letters, New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania, 2001 by Tan, Christina G. et al.
Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1073
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In October 2001, two inhalational anthrax and four cutaneous anthrax cases, resulting from the processing
of Bacillus anthracis–containing envelopes at a New Jersey mail facility, were identified. Subsequently, we
initiated stimulated passive hospital-based and enhanced passive surveillance for anthrax-compatible syn-
dromes. From October 24 to December 17, 2001, hospitals reported 240,160 visits and 7,109 intensive-
care unit admissions in the surveillance area (population 6.7 million persons). Following a change of
reporting criteria on November 8, the average of possible inhalational anthrax reports decreased 83% from
18 to 3 per day; the proportion of reports requiring follow-up increased from 37% (105/286) to 41% (47/
116). Clinical follow-up was conducted on 214 of 464 possible inhalational anthrax patients and 98 possi-
ble cutaneous anthrax patients; 49 had additional laboratory testing. No additional cases were identified.
To verify the limited scope of the outbreak, surveillance was essential, though labor-intensive. The flexibil-
ity of the system allowed interim evaluation, thus improving surveillance efficiency.
n the fall of 2001, a multistate investigation involving
local, state, and federal public health and law enforcement
authorities identified letters intentionally contaminated with
Bacillus anthracis spores; these letters were processed through
the Trenton Processing and Distribution Center on September
18 and October 9. On October 13, the New Jersey Department
of Health and Senior Services (NJDHSS) received reports of
two postal employees with clinical symptoms compatible with
cutaneous anthrax; their illnesses began on September 26 and
28. On October 18, following the confirmation of the first
anthrax case in New Jersey, the Trenton Processing and Distri-
bution Center was closed. Subsequently, NJDHSS identified a
total of six anthrax cases (two inhalational, four cutaneous), all
reported from October 13 to 24 (1,2). 
On October 24, NJDHSS and the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (CDC) began formal surveillance for spec-
ified clinical syndromes compatible with anthrax. Surveillance
was implemented with the objectives of improving case find-
ing, describing the spectrum of clinical signs and symptoms of
possible anthrax illness, characterizing the population at risk,
and determining the magnitude of the outbreak. This report
describes the surveillance efforts and results. 
Methods
From October 24 to December 17, NJDHSS and CDC
implemented passive surveillance (3) for syndromes compati-
ble with anthrax, supported with specific laboratory testing for
B. anthracis. This surveillance included two components:
stimulated passive hospital-based surveillance (4) for inhala-
tional anthrax and enhanced passive surveillance for inhala-
tional anthrax and cutaneous anthrax. 
Stimulated Passive Hospital-Based 
Surveillance for Inhalational Anthrax
We implemented stimulated passive hospital-based sur-
veillance in 15 counties in New Jersey, Delaware, and Penn-
sylvania, on October 24. Infection control professionals (ICPs)
of all acute-care hospitals of 10 New Jersey, 2 Pennsylvania,
and 3 Delaware counties were invited to participate; specialty
and psychiatric hospitals were not included in surveillance
(Figure 1). Reporting criteria for possible inhalational anthrax
included any emergency department patient with a diagnosis
of respiratory failure or severe respiratory distress or any
intensive-care unit (ICU) patient from whom blood, cere-
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brospinal fluid, or pleural fluid cultures were obtained. Report-
ing criteria and forms were distributed to ICPs and local and
state health departments by e-mail or fax. We requested that
ICPs provide a daily summary report that documented the total
number of emergency department visits and ICU admissions
that met reporting criteria for possible inhalational anthrax.
For each patient whose illness met reporting criteria for inhala-
tional anthrax, ICPs completed a case ascertainment form that
provided details on the patient's demographic information and
clinical symptoms. 
We requested that hospitals provide daily summary reports
within 1 day of the date of the reported data. Infection control
professionals faxed or e-mailed completed summary and case
ascertainment reports to officials in appropriate local and state
health departments; these reports were then forwarded to the
CDC New Jersey Operations Center at NJDHSS for review.
Data summaries were provided periodically to ICPs during the
surveillance period. 
To improve the surveillance system, we performed interim
evaluations and conducted periodic conference calls with local
and state health departments and participating ICPs to gain
feedback on surveillance methodology. In response to com-
ments that initial inhalational anthrax reporting criteria encom-
passed a broad spectrum of differential diagnoses including
illnesses unlikely to be undiagnosed anthrax, such as chronic
pulmonary disease, we modified clinical criteria for reporting
on November 8. ICPs were then requested to report any emer-
gency department or ICU patient with illness onset after Sep-
tember 18 with 1) fever, cough, abnormal chest x-ray, and no
prior chronic pulmonary disease, 2) fever, respiratory failure,
or severe respiratory distress not clearly attributable to a previ-
ously diagnosed chronic pulmonary or cardiac disease, or 3)
sepsis of unknown origin. We distributed revised reporting cri-
teria to ICPs and local and state health departments through e-
mail, facsimile, and telephone communication. 
Passive Surveillance for Inhalational 
or Cutaneous Anthrax
Passive surveillance for possible inhalational anthrax and
cutaneous anthrax cases was conducted statewide in New Jer-
sey. Reporting criteria for possible cutaneous anthrax included
persons with a suspicious lesion including an ulcer with sur-
rounding erythema, edema, or vesicles, or a blackened eschar
forming 3–7 days after the onset of the skin lesion; an ulcer-
ative or necrotic lesion and a history of possible exposure to
anthrax, including employment at a postal facility or handling
mail in another setting; or laboratory evidence suggestive of B.
anthracis infection.
Reporting criteria for both inhalational anthrax and cutane-
ous anthrax were made available on websites of the Medical
Society of New Jersey (available at: http://www.msnj.org/),
New Jersey Association of Family Physicians (available at:
http://www.njafp.org/), and NJDHSS (available at: http://
www.state.nj.us/health/); surveillance information was also
distributed through press releases to the media. 
Suspicious illnesses were reported to the New Jersey
Emergency Operations Center and to the CDC New Jersey
Operations Center. Nurses, physicians, and epidemiologists
from NJDHSS and CDC fielded general and medical inquiries
and reviewed reports. 
Clinical Follow-Up
After reviewing all surveillance reports, we followed up on
reports of patients considered to be at risk based on clinical
symptoms or exposure history (e.g., employment at a postal
facility and occupations that involved mail handling) or of
patients without clear alternative diagnoses. Through inter-
views with physicians, nurses, ICPs, hospital laboratory staff,
and patients, we obtained additional history on clinical symp-
toms, exposure, and occupational history and any preliminary
hospital laboratory results available by the time of follow-up. 
Clinical specimens, including whole blood, sera, pleural
fluid, and skin biopsies, were obtained from persons with
highly suspicious illness or credible exposure history and cul-
tured at the New Jersey Public Health and Environmental Lab-
oratories. CDC laboratories performed additional tests,
including immunohistochemical staining of clinical specimens
with B. anthracis capsule and cell-wall antibody, B. anthracis–
specific polymerase chain reaction, and serologic detection of
immunoglobulin G to B. anthracis protective antigen. 
Resources Required for Surveillance
To examine the resources required for surveillance, we
documented the number and type of persons and organizations
and the time required to collect and analyze surveillance data.
We also designed and distributed a survey to describe the
resources available to hospitals participating in stimulated pas-
sive surveillance and to assess ICPs’ experiences with surveil-
lance activities. ICPs faxed completed questionnaires to the
NJDHSS for analysis.
Figure 1. Counties participating in active surveillance, New Jersey,
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Medical Examiner Data Review
Concurrent with the surveillance efforts, the New Jersey
State Medical Examiner asked all county medical examiners to
retrospectively review all unexplained deaths due to acute res-
piratory illness back to September 1. In addition, all county
medical examiners were instructed to accept for autopsy any
unexplained deaths due to acute respiratory illness. 
Data Management and Analysis
For each participating hospital, we calculated the ratio
between the number of daily reports received and the number
of expected reports. The expected number of reports per hospi-
tal was the number of days a hospital participated in surveil-
lance, calculated from the date of the first report received to
December 17. 
We used Access 2000 (Microsoft Corp., Redmond, WA) to
maintain data and generate summary reports. Data were ana-
lyzed using Epi Info 2000, Epi Map version 2, and SAS ver-
sion 8.0 (SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, NC).
Results
Stimulated Passive Hospital-Based Surveillance
In the three states affected, all 61 acute-care hospitals from
15 counties conducted stimulated passive surveillance. During
the 1st week of surveillance, all 26 hospitals in six counties
were incorporated into the surveillance system. By the 4th
week, as surveillance expanded into additional counties, all
hospitals in these areas were incorporated into the system.
Seventy-eight percent to 91% of all participating hospitals pro-
vided daily summary reports during 6 of 8 weeks of the sur-
veillance period. Reporting rates were lowest during the 1st
and last weeks of the surveillance interval (Figure 2).
During the entire 8-week surveillance period, in New Jersey,
participating hospitals provided reports a mean of 89% (range
18% to 100%) of days during which they participated in surveil-
lance; in Delaware, the mean was 86% (range 82% to 91%); and
in Pennsylvania, the mean was 74% (range 23% to 94%). 
Thirty-nine (64%) participating hospitals were commu-
nity-based acute-care facilities; among community-based
facilities, participating hospitals provided reports a mean of
88% (range 18% to 100%) of the days during which they par-
ticipated in surveillance. Twenty-two (36%) participating hos-
pitals were university-based acute-care facilities; participating
hospitals provided reports a mean of 84% (range 23% to
100%) of days during which they participated in surveillance.
Following an increase in reporting criteria specificity on
November 8, the average of possible inhalational anthrax
reports decreased 83% from 18 to 3 per day. The proportion of
reports requiring follow-up increased 10% from 37% (105/
286) to 41% (47/116). 
Reporting of Possible Inhalational Anthrax Illness
During October 24 to December 17, stimulated passive
hospital-based surveillance generated reports of 240,160 emer-
gency department visits and 7,109 ICU admissions from a sur-
veillance population of 6.7 million residents. Of these
emergency department visits and ICU admissions, 402 patients
whose illnesses met clinical criteria for possible inhalational
anthrax were identified by ICPs. The clinical investigation
team then identified 152 patients whose clinical presentation
warranted collection of additional information, of whom 10
(7%) had additional laboratory testing performed at the state or
CDC laboratories. Passive surveillance generated a total of 62
reports of patients meeting clinical criteria for inhalational
anthrax from over 6,000 phone calls to the New Jersey Emer-
gency Operations Center and the CDC New Jersey Operations
Center. After preliminary follow-up of all 62 reports, the CDC
or state laboratories performed additional tests on specimens
from 13 (21%) of these patients. 
No additional inhalational anthrax cases were identified
among the 214 reports of possible inhalational anthrax that
were followed up. A total of 103 (48%) had follow-up diag-
noses of chronic pulmonary or acute infectious processes,
including asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
exacerbations (13 reports), bronchitis (6 reports), pneumonia
(40 reports), and other pulmonary conditions (44 reports). For
the remaining 111 (52%), the diagnosis of anthrax was ruled
out but no alternative diagnosis was identified. 
Reporting of Possible Cutaneous Anthrax Illness
No new cutaneous anthrax cases were identified among the
98 reports meeting surveillance criteria for cutaneous anthrax,
including 26 (27%) that warranted additional testing.  Of these
98 reports, 32 (33%) involved follow-up diagnoses of cellulitis
(6 reports), herpes zoster (5 reports), contact dermatitis (11
reports), or other dermatologic illnesses, including chronic
conditions such as eczema (10 reports). For the remaining 66,
the diagnosis of anthrax was ruled out, but no alternative diag-
nosis was identified.
Figure 2. Hospital participation in simulated passive surveillance for
possible inhalational anthrax by surveillance week; Delaware, New Jer-
sey, and Pennsylvania; October 24–December 17, 2001.BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
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Resources Required for Surveillance
In the private sector of the population in these states, hun-
dreds of clinicians, including ICPs and physicians, reported
suspicious illnesses during the surveillance period. In the pub-
lic sector, one to three epidemiologists from the NJDHSS and
CDC team reviewed reports daily and entered them into a
database on the day they were received. These epidemiologists
then determined which reports were forwarded to the clinical
investigation team for additional follow-up. 
Two to three other physician epidemiologists followed up
with physicians and ICPs to determine which of these patients
warranted more definitive testing at the state or CDC laborato-
ries. These physicians provided consultative information on
clinical questions related to anthrax and instructed community
clinicians on laboratory testing protocols.  
Finally, one epidemiologist managed laboratory matters,
including arrangements for transporting, tracking, and updat-
ing results for specimens. Numerous state and CDC lab staff
performed testing; several epidemiologists in Atlanta helped
report and interpret CDC testing results.
A total of 37 (61%) ICPs from the 61 hospitals participat-
ing in stimulated surveillance completed a survey to describe
the resources available to hospitals and to assess experiences
with surveillance activities. Most respondents represented
community-based hospitals, with <100 beds and at least one
full-time ICP. All hospitals responding in the survey had both
e-mail and fax capacity; 35 (95%) ICPs received surveillance
information by either fax or e-mail; the remainder received
information through telephone or other contact.
Before modifications to reporting, 21 (57%) ICPs reported
that each daily summary report took 0.5–1 h to complete; 10
(26%) spent 1–3 h; and 5 (13%) spent >3 h. Nine (24%)
respondents stated the initial criteria were broad and included
many persons with illnesses not attributable to anthrax (e.g.,
asthma, congestive heart failure). After modifications, 30
(81%) ICPs spent 0.5–1 h completing daily summary reports;
7 (18%) spent 1–3 h.
Medical Examiner Data
During the surveillance period, only one unexplained death
after September 1 was reported to the state medical examiner.
The patient, a 44-year-old woman with a smoking history and
several days of nonfebrile respiratory illness, died on October
14; chest radiographs and blood and sputum cultures were
negative. She had been unemployed and had no history of mail
handling. No samples were available for additional testing,
and no additional follow-up was needed. 
Discussion
Intensive and comprehensive surveillance was an essential
component of the national response to the crisis precipitated
by this event. In New Jersey, the source of all recognized let-
ters containing B. anthracis, we implemented surveillance for
clinical syndromes compatible with inhalational or cutaneous
anthrax over a wide geographic area representing a large popu-
lation base. The information gathered through this surveillance
was pivotal in documenting the relatively limited scope of the
outbreak-associated anthrax cases, which in turn confirmed
that exposures sufficient to cause disease occurred primarily
among persons with occupational exposure to mail processed
by one distribution center. 
Surveillance efforts were successful in engaging hospitals
and health-care providers to identify and report patients with
clinical syndromes compatible with inhalational or cutaneous
anthrax. We were able to investigate the etiologies of these
patients’ illnesses and document that additional cases of
anthrax did not occur. This finding, in the context of a compre-
hensive surveillance system, helped to characterize the out-
break, demonstrating that it was confined to the originally
recognized cases and confirming that the risk of developing
illness in the general population was low. The finding also pro-
vided a level of assurance that cases due to this bioterrorist
attack, as well as possible additional attacks on other mail pro-
cessing centers in the area, were not occurring and confirmed
that additional public health control measures were not
needed. 
This surveillance program included several successful ele-
ments. The mobilization of state and local health departments
in regional efforts allowed for the monitoring of a large geo-
graphic area and fostered cooperation among the jurisdictions.
We involved hospital-based surveillance participants by pro-
viding feedback and soliciting their input, and the system
became more efficient with modifications implemented in
response. Surveillance heightened awareness among the prac-
ticing physicians, and their cooperation allowed for timely
reporting and efficient clinical follow-up. 
Because all acute-care hospitals in the selected areas par-
ticipated fully, providing us with reports of many patients with
the defined clinical syndromes, cases in the region were likely
not missed. In addition, reporting and clinical follow-up were
conducted in a timely fashion, which is critical to public health
surveillance and response (5,6). Daily summary reports were
usually received within 1 to 2 days of the date of the reported
data; longer lag times or missed reports occurred mainly dur-
ing weekends. Possible inhalational anthrax reports were usu-
ally received within 1 day of the reported date of hospital visit
or admission. Follow-up of each possible inhalational anthrax
report took up to several days to complete; lag time in most
circumstances was attributable to the period of time needed to
receive laboratory results. 
Our surveillance efforts had several limitations. While hos-
pital-based surveillance was limited to selected counties,
numerous reports throughout New Jersey were received. Cases
before surveillance implementation may have been missed, but
the state medical examiner’s retrospective data would have
likely captured these possible earlier cases. Finally, surveil-
lance was costly because of demands on personnel in partici-
pating hospitals and at the health department, which was
dependent on support from CDC personnel assigned to the
state during the outbreak period. This intense level ofEmerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1077
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surveillance was justifiable given the nature of the anthrax
emergency, but it was neither necessary nor feasible to sustain
in the long term, once information showed that no additional
anthrax exposures had occurred and the upper limit of the
incubation period had passed. Keeping the resource-intensive-
ness in mind, the best ways to integrate surveillance of bioter-
rorist attacks into existing public health systems need to be
evaluated. 
Because the agents or methods of future bioterrorist
attacks cannot be predicted with certainty, planning surveil-
lance to detect a future bioterrorist attack will require that pub-
lic health departments consider all possible scenarios and
develop a multifaceted approach (7). A future attack might be
similar to the recent experience with B. anthracis, in which
astute clinicians reported a small number of cases, illustrating
how community health-care providers are integral to success-
ful surveillance efforts. In this scenario, detecting new cases
will depend on accurate diagnostics and timely reporting by
medical care providers, highlighting the importance of educat-
ing practicing clinicians on what to report, how to report, and
ultimately how to interface with the public health system. To
this end, public health departments should foster education
about bioterrorism and surveillance in the medical community
and engage key community medical personnel in these educa-
tional and surveillance efforts (8). In addition, public health
departments should encourage clinicians to report diagnostic
clues and patients with illness patterns that might indicate an
unusual infectious disease outbreak associated with intentional
release of a biologic agent (9).  Finally, public health depart-
ments should develop the capability to immediately investi-
gate suspicious reports (10). As our experience in New Jersey
demonstrates, establishing and maintaining a comprehensive
surveillance system in response to a bioterrorist attack is com-
plex and resource-intensive. Once our surveillance system
established that the outbreak was not ongoing, sustaining such
an intense surveillance effort was not necessary.   The greater
challenge for public health departments in the United States
will be to design sustainable systems that can assist in detect-
ing future outbreaks. 
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